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BEHAVIOURAL ASPECTS INFLUENCING
THE PERFORMANCE OF TURKISH FUND
MANAGERS
OMAR MASOOD*
BRUNO S. SERGI**

ABSTRACT: Using original survey data collected by the authors in 2005 we investigate
the determinants of Turkish fund managers’ performance as measured by the number of
clients that a fund manager has, the number of investment funds that the manager is
responsible for and the size of the manager’s portfolio. All three measures of Turkish fund
manager performance systematically vary with fund manager characteristics. This is consistent with Chevalier and Ellison’s (1999) finding for the USA that some managers are
better than others. Further, the number of training courses attended by a manager and
years of experience (in a particular organisation and/or as a fund manager) are found to
positively influence all three measures of performance. This may suggest that senior managers and those with more training are given more responsibility than less experienced and
less trained managers.
Keywords: Turkish fund managers; Performance and ordered choice models
UDC: 330.142:338.121(560)
JEL: C25, C51, C52, G21

1. INTRODUCTION
There is a large and growing literature that links fund manager performance to the characteristics of fund managers. For example, Fama (1980), Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Holstrom (1982) emphasised agency conflicts and career concerns. Smith and Goudzwaard
(1970) and Chevalier and Ellison (1999) looked at the relevance of education. Golec
(1996) examined a wide range of characteristics including tenure, MBA qualification,
performance, risk-taking and expenses. Other studies focus on the concept of herding
borrowed from behavioural finance. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) focus on herding due
to signal jamming between different types of managers, Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani
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et al. (1992) and Welch (1992) on herding due to inefficient information transmission and
King (1995) on herding due to free riding in information gathering. Trueman (1994) and
Zwiebel (1995) suggest that herding among managers who are evaluated relative to their
peers might be a result of reputational concerns.
Mcnabb and Whitfield (2003) state that recent years have revealed extensive innovations in compensation systems and, in particular, a variety of attempts to link pay to a
measure of performance. Such innovations have often been related to broader initiatives
to improve the performance of organisations and especially efforts to increase employee
involvement in decision-making (Appelbaum and Batt, 1994; Walsh, 1993).
The paper’s two major features are the use of survey methodology to obtain primary
data and the application of ordered choice models for analysing this data. Thus, this
research is unique and stands in contrast to other empirical studies on banking crises that
are based principally on published annual data, such as Kaminski and Rhinehart (2000,
1998), Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a) Eichengreen and Rose (1998) the IMF
(1998) and Gavin and Haussman (1996). Most of the related empirical studies focus on
industrialised countries with developed financial systems, especially the USA. However,
the link between performance and the characteristics of fund managers has now become
a relevant concern in emerging markets due to the recent growth of fund management
in these markets. Further, there is ongoing evidence that emerging market financial systems are more vulnerable to political interference, corruption and insider trading than
those of developed countries. Conditions like these could conceivably have a significant
influence on fund manager characteristics and behaviour.
Perhaps the lack of literature can be explained by the lack of data. Here we use data collected from questionnaire interviews with 110 different fund managers and regulators
from the four most significant banks in Turkey.
In this paper we take a first step towards studying the link between fund manager performance and fund manager characteristics in the context of an emerging market, Turkey. More specifically, we test the statistical significance between three measures of fund
manager performance and fund manager characteristics such as education, job experience and the like. Our study is similar in spirit to Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and Golec
(1996) but differs in one important way. Rather than use aggregated, observable data
across some fund industry or sub-industry, our analysis is based on the statistical information gathered from personal interviews with 110 fund managers in four of Turkey’s
largest banks. Our analysis includes characteristics such as age, highest level of education, number of years of experience and training.
Henceforth, in this paper we explore the experience of fund managers based on their
relative traits and how their performance and efficiency is affected in terms of investment decision-making and important implications. The paper aims to expose all fund
managers to a series of questions that may help in analysing the associations between
various inputs and their performance. The paper is as organised as follows. We continue
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with a brief literature review in the next section. Section 3 describes the data, the methodology and discusses the principal empirical findings. The last section concludes with
a short summary.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Avery and Chevalier (1998) state that the probability of termination decreases steeply
with a performance when managers have negative excess returns, but it is fairly insensitive to differences at positive excess return levels. As a result, young managers may
have an incentive to avoid unsystematic risk when selecting their portfolios. Modigliani
and Pogue (1975), Starks (1987), Grinblatt and Titman (1989) and Admati and Peiderer
(1997) consider the incentive effects of explicit performance contracts between a mutual
fund company (or manager) and mutual fund investors. Starks (1987) and Grinblatt and
Titman (1989) show that mutual fund fee schedules which are nonlinear in fund performance may distort the fund’s risk incentive.
Smith and Goudzwaard (1970) analysed the relevance of education for investment management and found that education does not have a clear effect on the performance of
graduates in their jobs as fund managers. However, using cross sectional data Chevalier
and Ellison (1999) find strong evidence between age and education as explanatory variables for fund performance, measured as risk-adjusted excess returns, even after adjusting
for behavioural differences and selection biases. From pension schemes, mutual funds,
banks and other financial institutions portfolio decisions rest with the fund managers.
There has been a growing concern that these managers adopt investment strategies that
are too similar. One possible explanation of this phenomenon may be found in the incentives schemes related to performance (Masood & Tunaru, 2006). Another explanation is based on herding, a concept from behavioural finance. For the latter, existing
literature focuses on herding due to either signal jamming between different types of
managers (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990), inefficient information transmission (Banerjee,
1992, Bikhchandani et al. 1992; Welch, 1992) or free riding in information gathering
(King, 1995).
Fama (1980) and Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that a manager’s investment decision can
be influenced by career concerns. Holstrom (1982) confi rms their conclusion but argues
that it is only one of a number of other factors that influence the investment decision
process. Following this line of reasoning, Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Zwiebel (1995),
Morris (1997), and Avery and Chevalier (1999) argue that the career concern factor leads
to herd behaviour in the fund manager community. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) emphasise that career issues of mutual fund managers play a significant role in their decisions about risk. Golec (1996) finds that the portfolio return is affected by the manager’s
tenure, age, and MBA status.
The subsequent academic literature (following Modigliani and Pogue [1975]) has noted
that a number of ways remain in which investment decisions may be affected both by
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the explicit compensation schemes of fund companies, and by implicit incentives which
derive from a desire to attract new customers. Chevalier and Ellison (1998) argue that a
manager being terminated is affected by the manager’s actions, past performance, that
aspects of the relationship might cause behaviour to vary systematically across managers, and they then examine these predictions by looking at how behaviour actually differs between younger and older managers.
Starks (1987) studied the impact of performance incentive fees on portfolio investment
management decisions and finds that a symmetric compensation contract1 is better than
a bonus contract2 and yields better results for the investor. In their study of the relationship between managers’ compensation and the relative performance of the funds they
manage, Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) find empirical evidence suggesting that midyear “loser” managers3 tend to increase the volatility of the funds they manage in the
second part of the assessment year. Yet Lemmon, Schallheim and Zender (2000) found
that financial contracts play an important role in providing incentives and the performance of a fund.
All previous research used information about fund managers from the outside, without
specific questioning of the managers under analysis. Here, we attempt to break this barrier and reveal the inside story.

3. EMPIRICAL MODELLING
The primary data were collected by a questionnaire (reported in the Appendix) given
to fund managers of banks in Turkey to determine three measures of fund manager
performance. We had face-to-face interviews with 110 senior Turkish fund managers in
the four major commercial banks in Turkey. The first dependent variable is the number
of clients a fund manager has, denoted Clients (question 7 from the survey) while the
second is the number of investment funds that the manager is responsible for, NoFunds,
(question 8). The third, PortSize (question 23) is the size of the manager’s portfolio.4 The
respondents were also asked if they thought that any factors other than those addressed
by our questionnaire were relevant determinants of their performance.
An ordered probit model is applied to the survey data as one of these variables, PortSize,
is ordinal. As we assign it with three ranked categories i.e., values 0, 1, 2, we applied or1

With a symmetric contract, the manager receives a percentage of the market value of the assets and a bonus
if the portfolio return exceeds the return on the designated benchmark or incurs a penalty in the opposite
case.
2

With a bonus performance incentive fee the manager receives a percentage of the market value of the assets
and a bonus if the portfolio return was higher than the return on some benchmark index; no penalties are
imposed
3
4

A “loser” manager is defi ned as a manager who is underperforming as regards the designated benchmark.

Clients, NoFunds and PortSize are arguably accurate and objective measures of fund manager performance
because they are terms that are relatively easy to determine and unlikely to be misreported. Th is is partly why
investigating such measures of performance may be of particular interest.
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dered choice estimation techniques to model this ordinal dependent variable. Here lower
values indicate a smaller size. We also used ordered logit models which yielded similar
results.
The ordered dependent variable model assumes the following latent variable form (see
Greene 2003, pp 736-740):5
K

Yi * = ∑ β k X ik + u i

(3.1)

k =1

where, X ik are the explanatory variables, u i is a stochastic error term and Yi * is the
unobserved dependent variable that is related to the observed dependent variable, Yi ,
(assuming three categories) as follows:

Yi = 1 ifif Yi * ≤ λ1
Yi = 2 ifif λ1 < Yi * ≤ λ 2

(3.2)

Yi = 3 ifif λ 2 < Yi *
where λ1 and λ 2 are unknown parameters (limit points) to be estimated with the coefficients (the β s). The probit form of this model assumes that the error, u i , is distributed
as a standard normal random variable.6 There are three forms of this model. The logit
form assumes the error has a logistic distribution, while the Gompit model specifies the
extreme value distribution for the error term. The probit form assumes that the error, εi,
is distributed as a standard normal random variable, hence we employed this form for
our approach.
The remaining two variables (Clients and NoFunds) are based upon interval/ratio data
so that the appropriate estimation method is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) – we employ
White’s heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors to calculate t-ratios.
For all three proxies of a fund manager’s performance, we took into consideration 13
explanatory factors as follows. Where a fund manager is male this is denoted Male (question 1 from the survey),7 where they are married this is denoted Married (question 2)8
and where they are single this is denoted Single (question 2).9 The manager’s years of
5

Our interest is primarily confi ned to the general direction of the correlation between the dependent and
independent variables. Therefore, we use the sign of βk to provide guidance on whether the estimated signs
of coefficients concur with our a priori expectations. This is instead of looking at the marginal effects which
indicate the direction of change of the dependent variable (for each value of the dependent variable) to a
change in Xik .
6

Greene (2003) suggests that probit and logit (the error has a logistic distribution) models yield results that
are very similar in practice.

7

Th is is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the manager is male and zero if they are female.

8

Th is variable takes the value of 1 if the manager is married and zero otherwise.

9

Th is variable takes the value of 1 if the manager is single and zero otherwise. We allowed three categories
for marital status being, married, single and divorced, hence we can only include two of them to avoid collinearity problems.
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experience in the organisation, YOE Organisation (question 3) and their years of experience as a fund manager, YOE Manager (question 4). Where the manager has a Master’s
degree this is denoted as Master’s degree (question 5a),10 a business degree, Business degree (question 5b),11 a degree from a Turkish institution, Turkish degree (question 5c),12
a degree from a UK institution, UK degree (question 5c),13 or a degree from a US institution, US degree (question 5c).14 The number of training courses a manager has attended
is included under Training (question 6), their age under Age (question 21), and the return
on the investment under Return.15
We provide the regression results for each of the three dependent variables (Clients, NoFunds and PortSize) in the next section of this paper. For each of the regressions we report a general model (including all the variables specified) and a parsimonious specification (or a small number of parsimonious models) obtained using the general-to-specific
methodology.16

3.1 Regression Results for the Number of Clients
The results of the OLS regressions for Clients are reported in Table 1. For the two models that are reported there is no evidence of misspecification, except for non-normally
distributed residuals for both models and heteroscedasticity in the general specification,
Model 1.17 Since we use t-ratios based upon White’s heteroscedasticity consistent coefficient standard errors, the results are considered robust to heteroscedasticity. Estimation
of the model excluding the outlying observation (fund manager 23) removed the evident
non-normality and yielded qualitatively similar results to those reported in Table 1 (see
Table 1b). Hence, we believe that the non-normality evident in Table 1 does not substantially affect our inference and we therefore present the results reported in Table 1 as
valid.

10

Th is variable takes the value of 1 if the manager has an MA, MSc or MBA and is zero otherwise.

11

Th is variable takes the value of 1 if the manager’s degree is in the area of business and is zero otherwise.

12

Th is variable takes the value of 1 if the manager’s degree is from Turkey and is zero otherwise.

13

Th is variable takes the value of 1 if the manager’s degree is from the UK and is zero otherwise.

14
Th is variable takes the value of 1 if the manager’s degree is from the USA and is zero otherwise. There were
four options for the country from which a degree was obtained, Turkey, the UK, the USA and other, so only
three variables could be included (for Turkey, the UK and the USA) to avoid collinearity problems.
15

Th is is an ordinal variable that is measured in percentages.

16

In this method, for the models that are considered valid for inference, we fi rst delete all variables with t-ratios below one (or, exceptionally, 0.5 if the t-ratios are very small for a large number of variables) and apply an
F-test (or likelihood ratio, LR, test) relative to the general model. If the restrictions cannot be rejected we then
delete all variables with t-ratios below 1.5 and then all explanatory factors with t-ratios below 1.96 (applying
F/LR tests relative to the general model). If any F/LR test for joint restrictions is rejected, we experiment to
fi nd the variable(s) that cause this rejection and retain them in the model.

17

We tested for autocorrelation, non-linear functional form, non-normally distributed residuals, heteroscedasticity, and parameter non-constancy.
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Although only two variables in Model 1 are statistically significant at the 5% level
(YOE Manager and Training) the removal of insignificant variables yields Model 2 in
which four variables are significant (YOE Organisation, YOE Manager, UK degree and
Training).18 This is our favoured model for inference given that it features no insignificance variables, the restrictions placed on Model 1 to obtain Model 2 cannot be rejected
and it features a better fi2 t compared to Model 1 – it explains about 70% of the variation in
Clients according to R .19 All the variables retained in Model 2 have positive coefficients,
except UK degree, which is broadly consistent with the expectations. The coefficients on
the variables indicate that for each extra year of experience in the organisation (or as a
manager) the fund manager gains, on average, 0.164 (0.374) clients. Holding a degree
from a UK institution reduces the number of clients by, on average, 0.753, while each
additional training course attended by a fund manager increases the number of clients
by 0.155, on average.20

3.2 Regression Results for the Number of Funds
Table 2 reports the OLS regression results for the number of funds variable (NoFunds).
There is evidence of autocorrelation, non-normality and heteroscedasticity for both
reported models, Model 3 and Model 4. Since we could reorder the data to remove the
autocorrelation and the statistics would remain unchanged we do not consider the
presence of autocorrelation as adversely affecting the results.21 As before, the use of
White’s coefficient standard errors addresses the problem of heteroscedasticity. Estimating the same models with the removal of the outlying observation (fund manager
23) from the sample (see Table 2b) removed the evident non-normality and yielded
qualitatively and quantitatively similar results. Hence, non-normality is not regarded
as adversely affecting our inferences. There is also some evidence of parameter nonconstancy at the 5% level across the sample for Model 4 but not Model 3. Th is suggests
that, for this model, the coefficients of the variables for the fi rst 55 fund managers
are different from the last 55 managers. However, in the models estimated without
observation 23 neither model has unstable coefficients at the 1% level (although Model
4 exhibits non-constant parameters at the 5% level). Thus, to the extent that there are
departures from coefficient equality they are arguably not serious. Nevertheless, we
note that there may be some heterogeneity across the sample and interpret the coefficients as averaged effects for the whole sample that provide generalisations for the
18

Variables that are insignificant in the general model may become significant through model reduction due
to, for example, increased efficiency and reduced collinearity. Hence our focus on the results of the parsimonious model is identifying the variables of statistical significance.

19
Model 2’s regression standard error indicates that the model incorrectly predicts the number of clients that
each fund manager has by, on average, 1.5 clients. This compares to the standard deviation of the data on
Clients of 2.7 clients.
20

To place these numbers in perspective, the number of clients that a fund manager had, in our sample,
ranged from 3 to 13 with a mean value of 7.036.

21
The use of cross-sectional data here contrasts with the use of time-series data where the order of the observations matters and reordering the data is not appropriate.
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population.22 We therefore present our results from Table 2 as valid for inference given
their similarity to those reported in Table 2b.
Two variables in the general model, Model 3, are statistically significant at the 5% level (YOE Manager and Training).23 Following the general-to-specific model reduction
method we identified the parsimonious specification, Model 4. Model 4 contains four
statistically significant variables (at the 5% level), YOE Organisation, YOE Manager,
Business degree and Training. We favour Model 4 over Model 3 because it has a superior fit and the zero coefficient restrictions cannot be rejected.24 In Model 4 we see that
three variables have the anticipated positive sign (YOE Organisation, YOE Manager and
Training) while Business degree has an unexpected negative sign. However, the impact
of holding a business degree is small: it reduces the number of funds by, on average, 1.191
(this is relative to an average number of funds of approximately 11.5). Thus, because such
a negative effect is difficult to rationalise and it is numerically small we interpret this
result as suggesting that holding a business degree has little influence on the number of
funds in a manager’s portfolio. The coefficients on the other significant variables indicate
that for each extra year of experience in the organisation (as a manager) the fund manager increases the number of funds by, on average, 0.258 (0.383), while each additional
training course attended by a fund manager increases the number of funds by 0.141, on
average.25

3.3 Regression Results for Portfolio Size
The ordered probit regression results for portfolio size (PortSize) are reported in Table
3.26 Model 5 is the general model and Model 6 is the associated parsimonious model
obtained after applying the general-to-specific method. Five variables are significant
in the general model while seven are significant in the favoured parsimonious specification, namely, Married, YOE Manager, Master’s degree, Business degree, Training,
Age and Return. Five variables have a positive coefficient suggesting that being married, having more years of experience as a manager, holding a Master’s degree, attending more training courses and being older will increase the fund manager’s portfolio
22

Coefficient inequality does not represent structural breaks in cross-sectional data as it does in time-series
data. It simply suggests that sub-groups of the sample may have different coefficients from each other. Given
that we have split the sample arbitrarily in half and have not ordered the sample in any particular way, it is
difficult to identify any particular feature that distinguishes each sub-group in a way that could explain the
differences in coefficients.
23

Th is is exactly the same as was found for the general specification for Clients, Model 1.

24

Model 4 explains about 55.3% of the variation in the dependent variable, while the regression standard
error indicates that the model incorrectly predicts the number of funds that each fund manager has by, on
average, 2. Th is compares to the standard deviation of the data on the Number of Funds of about 2.926.

25
To place these numbers in perspective, the number of funds that a fund manager had ranged from 5 to 19
with a mean value of 11.491.
26
Th is variable has a minimum value of zero, a maximum of two and a mean value of 0.955. The standard
deviation is 0.596.
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size.27 These coefficients all seem plausible. Indeed, the finding that holding a Master’s
degree has significant positive influences on fund manager performance is consistent
with Chevalier and Ellison (1999). They found, for the USA, that fund managers with
higher average SAT scores at their undergraduate institutions achieved higher returns.
In contrast to Chevalier and Ellison (1999) who find that older fund managers typically
secure lower returns, our results indicate that age has a significant positive effect on portfolio size.28 This may be due to the different measures of performance used (Chevalier
and Ellison, 1999, model returns). Older managers may be trusted with more responsibility and hold larger portfolios while career concerns may explain why older managers
do not achieve as high returns as younger managers who may, for example, feel the need
to work harder. The coefficients on the variables Business degree and Return exhibit an
unexpected negative sign in our favoured model. The coefficient on Return is very small
(–0.078), as are the marginal effects (see Table 3b), suggesting that this effect is numerically minor. Hence, given the difficulty in rationalising this negative sign we interpret
this result as suggesting that return has little impact on portfolio size. Similarly, and as
argued for the number of funds model, we interpret the negative sign for the business
degree variable as suggesting that holding a business degree has little influence on the
portfolio size.

3.4 Comparison of Inferences of the Performance Regressions
All three measures of performance have very similar determinants (and non-determinants). Clients is determined by YOE Organisation, YOE Manager, UK degree and
Training while the significant explanatory factors of NoFunds are the same as for Clients, except UK degree is replaced by Business degree. The determinants of PortSize are
Married, YOE manager, Master’s degree, Business degree, Training, Age and Return.
The signs of the coefficients on the determinants that are common to favoured models
with different dependent variables are always the same. This may be expected given the
simple correlations among these performance proxies: Clients, NoFund and PortSize
have high positive correlations (all exceed 0.8).29 Notably the number of training courses
attended and years of experience in a particular organisation and/or as a fund manager
have a positive and significant effect on all of our measures of performance. This suggests that senior managers and those with more training are given more responsibility
than less experienced and less trained managers. Further, our finding that Turkish fund
managers have systematically different performances is consistent with Chevalier and
Ellison’s (1999) findings that, for the USA, some managers are better than others.

27

Marginal effects are reported in Table 3b. However, it is difficult to comment on these in a way that is of interest to us here. We confi ne ourselves to interpreting the coefficients as indicating the sign, but not marginal
effect, of the explanatory factors on the dependent variable.

28

It should be noted that this was a “fragile” fi nding for Chevalier and Ellison (1999) because age was significant in some of their regressions but not others.

29
The correlation between Clients and NoFund (and PortSize) is 0.887 (and 0.886) and between NoFund and
PortSize it is 0.833.
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4. CONCLUSION
Using data from a survey of 110 Turkish fund manages we have estimated models for
three different measures of fund manager performance (number of clients, number of
funds and portfolio size). The number of clients is positively correlated with years of experience in the organisation, years of experience as a manager and the number of training courses attended and negatively associated with holding a UK degree. The number
of funds is also positively determined by years of experience in the organisation, years of
experience as a manager and the number of training courses attended but is negatively
related to holding a business degree. The determinants of portfolio size are being married, years of experience as a manager, holding a master’s degree, holding a business
degree, the number of training courses attended, the manager’s age and the return on
investment. All of these variables’ coefficients have a plausible positive sign, except for
holding a business degree and return which exhibit unexpected negative signs. However,
we note that the effects for business degree and return are numerically small and interpret them as having little effect on our measures of fund manager performance.
All three measures of performance are positively determined by the number of training
courses attended and years of experience in a particular organisation and/or as a fund
manager. This suggests that senior managers and those with more training are given
more responsibility than less experienced and less trained managers. Further, all three
measures of performance systematically vary with fund manager characteristics. This is
consistent with Chevalier and Ellison’s (1999) finding for the USA that some managers
are better than others.
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TABLE 1: Number of Clients Regressions (OLS)

Variables
Intercept
Male
Married
Single
YOE Organisation
YOE Manager
Master’s degree
Business degree
Turkish degree
UK degree
US degree
Training
Age
Return
Fit

R

2

S
SBC
F(R2=0)
F(1→2)
Misspecification
FA
FFF
χ2N
FH
FCH
FPF

Model 1
Coefficients
t-ratio
0.734
0.476
0.468
0.831
0.345
0.930
–0.221
–0.514
0.206
1.279
0.386
4.498
0.717
1.041
–0.435
–1.386
–0.047
–0.112
–0.857
–1.658
–0.077
–0.157
0.143
2.671
–0.021
–0.307
–0.012
–0.347
(Test) Statistic
Probability

Model 2
Coefficients
0.720

0.164
0.374

2.106
4.629

–0.753

–2.597

0.155

3.099

(Test) Statistic

Probability

0.675

0.695

1.555
4.184
18.428
NA
Test Statistic
0.334
0.815
34.618
1.979
0.269
0.424

1.507
3.825
63.139
0.282
Test Statistic
1.529
0.028
28.619
2.074
0.561
0.521

0.000
Probability
0.565
0.369
0.000
0.019
0.996
0.998

t-ratio
1.070

0.000
0.978
Probability
0.219
0.868
0.000
0.053
0.730
0.990

The dependent variable is Number of Clients, the number of observations in the sample
2
is 110 and White’s heteroscedasticity adjusted t-ratios are reported. R is the coefficient
of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom, s denotes the unbiased estimate of
the regression standard error, F(R 2=0) gives the F-test for the significance of the overall
explanatory power of the model and F(1→2) is an F-test for the deletion of variables from
Model 1 to obtain the parsimonious specification. The reported misspecification tests
(Misspecification) are F-versions of Breusch-Godfrey’s test for first-order autocorrelation (FA), Ramsey’s Rest test for non-linear functional-form (FFF) and Chow’s first and
second tests for parameter non-constancy (FCH and FPF, respectively). The chi-squared
distributed Jarque-Bera test for non-normally distributed residuals (χ2N) is also reported.
The Chow and Predictive Failure tests split the sample between observations 55 and 56.
All statistics are produced using EViews 5.0.
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TABLE 1b: Number of Clients Regressions (OLS)

Variables
Intercept
Male
Married
Single
YOE Organisation
YOE Manager
Master’s degree
Business degree
Turkish degree
UK degree
US degree
Training
Age
Return
Fit

R

2

S
SBC
F(R2=0)
F(1→2)
Misspecification
FA
FFF
χ2N
FH
FCH
FPF

Model 1
Coefficients
t-ratio
0.013
0.009
0.412
0.745
0.349
0.980
–0.146
–0.353
0.198
1.249
0.401
4.613
0.882
1.318
–0.508
–1.616
–0.018
–0.042
–0.838
–1.618
–0.002
–0.004
0.143
2.718
0.001
0.002
–0.023
–0.675
(Test) Statistic
Probability

Model 2
Coefficients
0.376

0.188
0.377

2.465
4.543

–0.760

–2.604

0.156

3.163

(Test) Statistic

Probability

0.732

0.745

1.417
4.000
23.634
NA
Test Statistic
0.721
0.065
3.270
1.253
0.348
0.606

1.381
3.652
79.823
0.425
Test Statistic
2.051
0.599
2.407
0.650
0.507
0.677

0.000
Probability
0.398
0.799
0.195
0.239
0.985
0.958

t-ratio
0.633

0.000
0.919
Probability
0.155
0.441
0.300
0.713
0.771
0.919

The dependent variable is Number of Clients, the number of observations in the sample
is 109 (the outlying 23rd observation has been omitted) and White’s heteroscedasticity
2
adjusted t-ratios are reported. R is the coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees
of freedom, s denotes the unbiased estimate of the regression standard error, F(R 2=0)
gives the F-test for the significance of the overall explanatory power of the model and
F(1→2) is an F-test for the deletion of variables from Model 1 to obtain the parsimonious specification. The reported misspecification tests (Misspecification) are F-versions
of Breusch-Godfrey’s test for first-order autocorrelation (FA), Ramsey’s Rest test for nonlinear functional-form (FFF) and Chow’s first and second tests for parameter non-constancy (FCH and FPF, respectively). The chi-squared distributed Jarque-Bera test for nonnormally distributed residuals (χ2N) is also reported. The Chow and Predictive Failure
tests split the sample between observations 55 and 56. All statistics are produced using
EViews 5.0.
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TABLE 2: Number of Funds Regressions (OLS)

Variables
Intercept
Male
Married
Single
YOE Organisation
YOE Manager
Master’s degree
Business degree
Turkish degree
UK degree
US degree
Training
Age
Return
Fit

R

2

S
SBC
F(R2=0)
F(3→4)
Misspecification
FA
FFF
χ2N
FH
FCH
FPF

Model 3
Coefficients
t-ratio
5.748
2.526
0.011
0.021
–0.318
–0.624
0.121
0.220
0.383
1.863
0.330
2.294
–0.569
–0.610
–1.356
–2.302
0.002
0.004
–0.831
–1.116
–0.152
–0.209
0.138
2.195
–0.057
–0.769
0.015
0.315
(Test) Statistic
Probability

Model 4
Coefficients
4.322

0.258
0.383

1.938
3.003

–1.191

–2.051

0.141

2.365

(Test) Statistic

Probability

0.533

0.553

2.000
4.686
10.565
NA
Test Statistic
5.775
0.001
18.232
2.171
1.676
0.813

1.956
4.347
34.758
0.489
Test Statistic
5.818
0.098
19.333
3.926
3.414
0.867

0.000
Probability
0.018
0.971
0.000
0.009
0.077
0.765

t-ratio
3.818

0.000
0.879
Probability
0.018
0.755
0.000
0.001
0.007
0.698

The dependent variable is Number of Funds, the number of observations in the sample
2
is 110 and White’s heteroscedasticity adjusted t-ratios are reported. R is the coefficient
of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom, s denotes the unbiased estimate of the
regression standard error, F(R 2=0) gives the F-test for the significance of the overall explanatory power of the model and F(3→4) is an F-test for the deletion of variables from
Model 3 to obtain Model 4. The reported misspecification tests (Misspecification) are
F-versions of Breusch-Godfrey’s test for first-order autocorrelation (FA), Ramsey’s Rest
test for non-linear functional-form (FFF) and Chow’s first and second tests for parameter
non-constancy (FCH and FPF, respectively). The chi-squared distributed Jarque-Bera test
for non-normally distributed residuals (χ2N) is also reported. The Chow and Predictive
Failure tests split the sample between observations 55 and 56. All statistics are produced
using EViews 5.0.
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TABLE 2b: Number of Funds Regressions (OLS)

Variables
Intercept
Male
Married
Single
YOE Organisation
YOE Manager
Master’s degree
Business degree
Turkish degree
UK degree
US degree
Training
Age
Return
Fit

R

2

S
SBC
F(R2=0)
F(3→4)
Misspecification
FA
FFF
χ2N
FH
FCH
FPF

Model 3
Coefficients
t-ratio
4.868
2.201
–0.057
–0.111
–0.313
–0.638
0.212
0.391
0.374
1.810
0.348
2.388
–0.368
–0.394
–1.445
–2.650
0.038
0.065
–0.807
–1.087
–0.060
–0.083
0.137
2.278
–0.030
–0.428
0.002
0.042
(Test) Statistic
Probability

Model 4
Coefficients
3.808

0.298
0.395

2.279
3.060

–1.370

–2.581

0.140

2.413

(Test) Statistic

Probability

0.602

0.619

1.842
4.525
13.574
NA
Test Statistic
6.164
0.304
0.698
1.595
1.642
1.030

1.802
4.184
44.930
0.501
Test Statistic
5.393
0.308
0.873
2.437
2.601
1.102

0.000
Probability
0.015
0.583
0.705
0.078
0.086
0.465

t-ratio
3.624

0.000
0.871
Probability
0.022
0.580
0.646
0.024
0.030
0.478

The dependent variable is Number of Funds, the number of observations in the sample
is 109 (the outlying 23rd observation has been omitted) and White’s heteroscedasticity
2
adjusted t-ratios are reported. R is the coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees
of freedom, s denotes the unbiased estimate of the regression standard error, F(R 2=0)
gives the F-test for the significance of the overall explanatory power of the model and
F(3→4) is an F-test for the deletion of variables from Model 3 to obtain Model 4. The reported misspecification tests (Misspecification) are F-versions of Breusch-Godfrey’s test
for first-order autocorrelation (FA), Ramsey’s Rest test for non-linear functional-form
(FFF) and Chow’s first and second tests for parameter non-constancy (FCH and FPF, respectively). The chi-squared distributed Jarque-Bera test for non-normally distributed
residuals (χ2N) is also reported. The Chow and Predictive Failure tests split the sample
between observations 55 and 56. All statistics are produced using EViews 5.0.
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TABLE 3: Portfolio Size (Ordered Probit Regressions)

Variables
Male
Married
Single
YOE Organisation
YOE Manager
Master’s degree
Business degree
Turkish degree
UK degree
USA degree
Training
Age
Return
Limit Points
λ1
λ2
Fit
Pseudo R2
SBC
LR statistic
LR(5→6)

Model 5
Coefficients
t-ratio
0.912
1.625
1.609
2.847
–0.122
–0.275
0.030
0.203
0.391
3.245
1.983
2.655
–1.313
–2.461
0.325
0.560
–0.084
–0.137
0.554
0.791
0.101
1.806
0.077
1.196
–0.084
–2.245
Coefficients
t-ratio
5.633
3.309
10.682
5.014
(Test) Statistic
Probability
0.578
1.394
113.633
0.000
NA

Model 6
Coefficients

t-ratio

1.416

3.338

0.399
1.613
–1.229

3.955
2.188
–2.855

0.122
0.079
–0.078
Coefficients
4.420
9.201
(Test) Statistic
0.564
1.164
110.778
2.855

2.135
1.992
–2.103
t-ratio
2.931
4.780
Probability

0.000
0.827

The dependent variable is portfolio size which takes on values 1, 2 and 3, so there are two
limit points, λi, i=1,2 – the intercept is not separately identified from the limit points.
The number of observations in the sample is 110. The z-statistics (in parentheses) are
based upon Huber-White standard errors which are robust to certain misspecifications
of the underlying distribution of the dependant variable (see E-Views 5.0 User Guide p.
651). The reported fit measures are the Pseudo R 2 [R 2 = 1 – (lnL / lnL0), where lnL and
lnL0 are the maximised values of the model’s likelihood function including all variables
and only incorporating an intercept, respectively – see Greene, 2003, pp. 683-684] and
Schwarz’s information criterion, SBC. Also included are chi-squared tests for the model’s
explanatory power, LR Statistic, and the deletion of variables from Model 5 to obtain the
restricted Model 6, LR(5→6) – probability values are given in parentheses. The probit
model assumes that the cumulative distribution function of the error term is standard
normal: Φ(λj – Σkβk X ik) = (2π)–½exp[–½(λj – Σkβk X ik)2], j=1,2. All Probit regressions were
estimated using E-Views 5.0.
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TABLE 3b: Marginal Effects of Model 6 (Portfolio Size)

Married
YOE Manager
Master’s degree
Business degree
Training
Age
Return

Pr(Y=1)
–0.058
–0.016
–0.066
0.050
–0.005
–0.003
0.003

Model 6
Pr(Y=2)
0.041
0.012
0.047
–0.035
0.004
0.002
–0.002

Pr(Y=3)
0.017
0.005
0.019
–0.015
0.001
0.001
–0.001

Marginal effects are reported for each value of the dependent variable, denoted Y, for all
variables included in Model 6 using the ordered probit specification. They are calculated
using the means of the explanatory variables, X k.

RECEIVED: MARCH 2009
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Appendix: Questionnaire for Turkish Investment (Fund) Managers

Name:

Position held:

Q1. Sex: Male/ Female
Q2. Marital Status:

Single

Married

Divorced

Q3. How many years of experience do you have within the organisation?
Q4. How many years of experience do you have as a fund manager?
Q5. Specify your educational qualification in terms of:
(a) Level of study:

BA

(b) Subject of study:

A business subject

(c) Country of study: UK

MA/MBA

USA

PhD

Other (please specify)

A non-business subject
Turkey

Other (please specify)

Q6. How many training courses have you attended as a fund manager?
Q7. How many clients do you have?
Q8. How many investment funds are you responsible for?
Q9. To what extent do you feel performance pressure as a fund manager? To a:
Very high degree

High degree

Moderate degree

Low degree

Very low degree
Q10. Are you satisfied with the incentives provided to fund managers?
Very satisfied,

satisfied,

neither satisfied or unsatisfied,

unsatisfied,

very unsatisfied
Q11. What is your level of satisfaction with the quality of risk management techniques
applied?
Very satisfied,

satisfied,

unsatisfied,

neither satisfied or unsatisfied,

very unsatisfied

Q12. How accurate are the data available to you on a scale from zero to four (inclusive),
with zero being highly inaccurate and four being highly accurate?
0

1

2

3

4
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Q13. How much do you rely on data to make your decisions?
Totally, To a large extent, To a moderate extent, To a limited extent Not at all
Q14. To what extent are you concerned with the volatility of today’s financial markets?
Totally concerned,

Highly concerned,

A little concerned,

Unconcerned

Moderately concerned,

Q15. To what extent are your investment decisions based on your personal judgement?
Totally, To a large extent, To a moderate extent, To a limited extent Not at all
Q16. How often do you use mathematical projections and statistical models for investment decisions?
Very often,

often,

sometimes,

seldom,

never

Q17. How efficient satisfied are you with these projections and models:
Very satisfied,
unsatisfied,

satisfied,

neither satisfied or unsatisfied,

very unsatisfied

Q18. What importance do you give to financial statements of different companies when
making investment decisions?
Very important important,

neither important nor unimportant,

unimportant , very unimportant
Q19. What importance do you give to non-financial data when making investment decisions?
Very important,
unimportant,

important,

neither important nor unimportant,

very unimportant

Q20. How much do you rely on credit rating agencies?
Totally,

a lot,

moderately,

a little,

not at all

Q21 What is your age?
Q22. What is the amount (band) of performance-related pay?
Q23. What is the size of your portfolio?
Q24. What is the return on the investment (capital employed)?

